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1 
LEAP OF FAITH: DETERMINING THE 
STANDARD OF FAITH NEEDED TO VIOLATE 
THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALING FOR DELAWARE 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 
PAT ANDRIOLA* 
Abstract: Delaware courts have long respected the right to contract in Delaware, 
and possibly no entity is afforded more privileges to set the boundaries of its cor-
porate form than the Delaware Limited Liability Company. Unlike nearly every 
other state, Delaware permits LLCs to abolish the duties of care and loyalty in 
their operating agreements, but forbids companies to eliminate liability for “any 
act or omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of the implied contractual 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” The problem with the phrase “bad faith 
violation” is that, when referencing a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, it implies that there exists a non-bad faith violation of the 
covenant. In determining whether or not “neutral faith” or “non-bad faith” viola-
tions of the implied covenant are permissible under Delaware LLC law, this es-
say argues that Delaware courts should look to the relatively short history of the 
covenant, the contractarian spirit of Delaware laws and courts, and section 18-
1101 of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act to hold that the implied 
covenant can only be violated in bad faith. 
INTRODUCTION 
Delaware courts have long respected the right to contract in Delaware, 
and possibly no entity is afforded more privileges to set the boundaries of its 
corporate form than the Delaware Limited Liability Company (“LLC”). Unlike 
nearly every other state, Delaware permits LLCs to not only abolish the duty 
of care in their operating agreements, but also the duty of loyalty.1 Thus, if 
their operating agreement so allows, directors of Delaware LLCs are immune 
from claims such as self-dealing, clandestine profit engorgement, and nepo-
tism, among others. However, Delaware law expressly forbids eliminating lia-
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bility for “any act or omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of the im-
plied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”2 
The problem with the phrase “bad faith violation” is that, when referenc-
ing a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, it implies 
that there exists a non-bad faith violation of the covenant. For example, what is 
a “good faith” breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
This essay acknowledges that in order to find a violation of the implied cove-
nant, “bad faith,” and not something akin to “neutral faith,” must be found. 
However, it also recognizes that Delaware courts have not expressed a coher-
ent policy rationale for why bad faith must be found. This essay recommends 
that Delaware courts consider that while Delaware LLCs are permitted to con-
tract around the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, the fact that the implied 
covenant is never permitted to be contracted out means the Delaware legisla-
ture expects it to be taken incredibly seriously. Thus, the weight of available 
authority on the subject indicates that the covenant cannot be violated except 
in bad faith. 
I. THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
Although it has a reputation as a generic catchall, the implied covenant 
isn’t a blanket opposition to anything seemingly done in bad faith. “General 
allegations of bad faith conduct are not sufficient” to state a claim, despite the 
claim’s frequent (and frequently unsuccessful) use as a last resort by parties 
who are otherwise disappointed with where their contracts have brought them.3 
In order to assert this claim, one must allege “a specific implied contrac-
tual obligation, a breach of that obligation . . . and resulting damage.”4 Courts 
will look at what the parties hoped to receive from the contract at the point 
when they entered it, and determine if the actions under scrutiny were (or 
should have been) reasonably considered ex ante. “When applying the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the temporal focus is critical . . . . The 
implied covenant looks to the past, and seeks to enforce terms that the parties 
would have agreed to themselves had they considered the issue in their original 
bargaining positions at the time of contracting.”5 Judges will “not rewrite the 
contract to appease a party who later wishes to rewrite a contract he now be-
lieves to have been a bad deal.”6 Rather, the covenant asks whether one party 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Id. 
 3 Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, L.L.C., 971 A.2d 872, 888 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 4 Fitzgerald v. Cantor, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 212, at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 1998). 
 5 Employees Ret. Sys. of City of St. Louis v. TC Pipelines GP, Inc., C.A. No. 11603–VCG, 2016 
WL 2859790, at *7 n.47 (Del. Ch. May 11, 2016) (internal quotations omitted). 
 6 Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1126 (Del. 2010). The court further acknowledges the right 
of parties “to enter into good and bad contracts,” noting that contracts of both types will be enforced 
by the law. See id. 
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is frustrating the purpose of the contract through some “loophole” not express-
ly outlined in the contract. 
Because Delaware courts show utmost consideration to the four corners 
of a voluntary agreement, they consider use of the covenant to be a “rare and 
fact-intensive exercise” saved only for a “narrow band of cases.”7 Parties al-
leging a violation of the covenant may not base their claims “on conduct au-
thorized by the terms of the agreement.”8 The difficulty of stating a claim for 
violation of the covenant means that parties rarely invoke it successfully.9 
II. GOOD FAITH AND BAD FAITH 
Bad faith is a very specific term of art in Delaware. In distinguishing the 
phrase from “fraud,” the Delaware Supreme Court has relied on Black’s Law 
Dictionary to find that 
[The] term “bad faith” is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but 
rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishon-
est purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea 
of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively 
operating with furtive design or ill will.10 
Indeed, a party’s mens rea is at the crux of bad faith. The Delaware Court of 
Chancery (the “Chancery Court”) has similarly held that a plaintiff must show 
that the defendant’s actions were driven by an “improper purpose” in order to 
prove bad faith.11 
“Good faith,” unlike bad faith, is not defined affirmatively by Delaware 
courts, and is instead almost always defined in reference to bad faith. For ex-
ample, when confronted with contracts that do not themselves define bad faith, 
courts have adopted a presumption that actions were taken in good faith “un-
less [they] went so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that [they 
seem] essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.”12 The Del-
aware Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) does affirmatively define good 
faith as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial stand-
                                                                                                                           
 7 Lonergan v. EPE Holdings LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1018 (Del. Ch. 2010) (first quoting Dunlap v. 
State Farm & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 442 (Del. 2005); then quoting Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid 
Soap, LP, 984 A.2d 126, 146 (Del. Ch. 2009)). 
 8 Dunlap, 878 A.2d at 441. 
 9 See Kuroda, 971 A.2d at 888. 
 10 Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199, 1208 
n.16 (Del. 1993) (quoting Bad Faith, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1983)). 
 11 See Amirsaleh v. Bd. of Trade of City of New York, Inc., C.A. No. 2822-CC, 2009 WL 
3756700, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2009). 
 12 CDX Holdings, Inc. v. Fox, 141 A.3d 1037, 1054 (Del. 2016), reargument denied (June 13, 
2016) (quoting DV Realty Advisors LLC v. Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, Ill., 75 
A.3d 101, 110 (Del. 2013)). 
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ards of fair dealing.”13 Still, outside of the specific commercial context of the 
UCC, “good faith” has been given no specific meaning; it has served only to 
exclude numerous forms of “bad faith” actions.14 
It is also unclear if “good faith” ought to be interpreted objectively or 
subjectively. For example, the Chancery Court has recently stated that the 
“common law definition of good faith, at least in the fiduciary context, was 
historically subjective, but there has been some suggestion that that may no 
longer be the case.”15 Determining whether something is in good faith is ex-
tremely fact-specific, making the term even more difficult to define.16 
III. NEUTRAL FAITH? 
Since good faith is defined only in reference to bad faith, do the two 
standards present the courts with an exclusive, binary set of options? In other 
words, is it possible to act “not in bad faith,” but at the same time not act “in 
good faith?” 
Delaware courts have not explicitly decided this issue, though they have 
used strong language in dicta to warn against the potential concept of “neutral 
faith.” The implied covenant is a relatively new phenomenon in Delaware, on-
ly dating back to the early 1980’s.17 Since that time, Delaware courts have of-
ten found implied covenant claims to be defeated because a party did not act in 
bad faith; however, in those cases they did not explicitly say that the party had 
acted in good faith, either.18 Some have said that in order “to plead an act or 
omission was not in good faith . . . a plaintiff must demonstrate that the de-
                                                                                                                           
 13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1-201 (2016). 
 14 See Dunlap, 878 A.2d at 441. 
 15 Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago v. DV Realty Advisors LLC, C.A. No. 7204–
VCN, 2012 WL 3548206, at *13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2012) (“The common law definition of good faith 
as applied to contracts is primarily subjective, but there is likely some conduct which is so unreasona-
ble that this Court will necessarily determine that it could not have been undertaken in good faith. 
That may be because the common law definition of good faith as applied to contracts contains an 
objective element or it may be that, regardless of the evidence presented as to subjective intent, the 
Court will necessarily (almost always) find that certain conduct could not possibly have been under-
taken in good faith.”). 
 16 See id. (“Context matters—what is utterly unreasonable in one setting may be perfectly ac-
ceptable in another.”). 
 17 The first reference to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Delaware was in 
1982. See Henry J. Majewski v. Magness Constr. Co., C.A. No. 056-10-81, 1982 WL 318020, at *1 
(Del. Com. Pl. July 28, 1982). 
 18 See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., 750 A.2d 1219, 1234 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Continental’s 
conduct does not strike me as unfair or in bad faith.”); see also Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 
1128 (Del. 2010) (“A party does not act in bad faith by relying on contract provisions for which that 
party bargained where doing so simply limits advantages to another party. We cannot reform a con-
tract because enforcement of the contract as written would raise ‘moral questions . . . .’ Accordingly, 
we affirm the Chancellor’s dismissal of [plaintiff’s claim].”). 
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fendants acted in bad faith.”19 Unfortunately, while Delaware courts have ex-
pressed their disdain for neutral faith, they have not put forth a compelling his-
torical account of or policy rationale behind the implied covenant that would 
lend itself to such an interpretation. 
IV. THE DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT’S  
TREATMENT OF THE COVENANT 
The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (“LLC Act”), which gov-
erns the creation and regulation of LLCs in Delaware, is intended “to give the 
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceabil-
ity of limited liability company agreements.”20 This is in line not only with 
longstanding Delaware principles, but also with Delaware courts’ specific 
treatment of LLCs, which are considered “creatures of contract . . . designed to 
afford the maximum amount of freedom of contract, private ordering and flex-
ibility to the parties involved.”21 When parties voluntarily arrange their affairs 
via contract, Delaware law exhibits a strong bias toward respecting that 
agreement.22 The Delaware LLC has been described as the “most flexible con-
tractual entity presently available in the global marketplace.”23 
This emphasis on the freedom of contract is complicated by section 18-
1101 of the LLC Act, which states, in relevant part, that an LLC operating 
agreement “may provide for the limitation or elimination of any and all liabili-
ties for breach of contract and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) of a 
member, manager or other person,” but cannot “eliminate liability for any act 
or omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of the implied contractual 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See Liberty Prop. L.P. v. 25 Massachusetts Ave. Prop. LLC, C.A. No. 3027–VCS, 2009 WL 
224904, at *5 n.21 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2009); see also Allen v. Encore Energy Partners, L.P., 72 A.3d 
93, 105 (Del. 2013) (“This conclusion does not alter the reasoning expressed in Court of Chancery 
decisions holding that there is no difference between ‘bad faith’ and ‘a lack of good faith’ in the con-
text of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”); Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 
235, 240 n.8 (Del. 2009) (concluding that though the court has used the terms “bad faith” and “failure 
to act in good faith” interchangeably in some contexts and noted that these concepts are not necessari-
ly identical in others, it would not, in this case, draw a distinction between the terms); Amirsaleh v. 
Bd. of Trade of City of New York, Inc., C.A. No. 2822-CC, 2009 WL 3756700, at *5 n.23 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 9, 2009) (noting that the Chancery Court has firmly rejected the idea that “not in good faith” 
means anything other than “bad faith”). Though the court in Liberty Property was applying District of 
Columbia law, the Chancery Court has held that the two jurisdictions are uniform in their rejection of 
a concept of “neutral faith.” See Amirsaleh, 2009 WL 3756700 at *5 n. 23. 
 20 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (2013). 
 21 R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, C.A. No. 3803-CC, 2008 WL 
3846318, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008) (quoting TravelCenters of Am. LLC v. Brog, C.A. No. 3516-
CC, 2008 WL 1746987, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2008)). 
 22 W. Willow-Bay Court, LLC v. Robino-Bay Court Plaza, LLC, C.A. No. 2742-VCN, 2007 WL 
3317551, at *12 (Del. Ch. Nov. 2, 2007). 
 23 Ann E. Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for Socially 
Driven Purposes, 38 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 772, 784 (2012). 
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”24 Under a plain-meaning construc-
tion, this latter provision may be read as imposing a “duty not to in bad faith 
violate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”25 This 
meaning would be consistent with the contractual interpretation canon, recog-
nized by Delaware courts, that “words in a statute should not be construed as 
surplusage if there is a reasonable construction which will give them mean-
ing.”26 
The absurdity doctrine, however, takes precedence over the surplusage 
canon.27 Under the construction proposed above, Delaware LLCs could, in 
their operating agreements, contract out the implied covenant in all instances 
that are not “bad faith” violations, including “neutral faith” violations. For ex-
ample, under this construction, an operating agreement could contain the fol-
lowing section: “Directors of Hypothetical LLC will not be liable for any and 
all violations of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that are not 
the byproduct of bad faith.” While this interpretation of the statute seems tex-
tually reasonable, it conflicts with the binary system of good/bad faith that 
most Delaware courts have applied. What appears far more likely is that the 
term “bad faith” is not placed where it is in section 18-1101 to specify the sub-
set of violations that are impermissible to contract out, but rather used simply 
to reemphasize what kind of conduct is generally required for violating the 
implied covenant. While this language is somewhat sloppy, it makes far more 
sense than the alternative, which would permit liability sections such as the 
hypothetical contractual provision above. 
Additionally, Delaware is one of the few states in the country that permits 
an LLC to completely eliminate the duty of loyalty.28 In fact, some other states 
                                                                                                                           
 24 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (2013). (“A limited liability company agreement may pro-
vide for the limitation or elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of contract and breach of 
duties (including fiduciary duties) of a member, manager or other person to a limited liability compa-
ny or to another member or manager or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a 
limited liability company agreement; provided, that a limited liability company agreement may not 
limit or eliminate liability for any act or omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of the implied 
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”). This language is borrowed directly from Dela-
ware’s law regarding partnerships, which is older than the LLC Act. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-
1101(f) (2010). 
 25 Brent J. Horton, The Going-Private Freeze-Out: A Unique Danger for Investors in Delaware 
Non-Corporate Business Associations, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 53, 77 n.145 (2013). 
 26 Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 900 (Del. 1994). 
 27 See Bryan A. Garner, Outtakes from a Treatise: Garner and Scalia Present a Quiz on Textual-
ism: Part 1 of 2, ABA J. (Oct. 1, 2012 7:20 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
outtakes_from_a_treatise_garner_and_scalia_present_a_quiz_on_textualism_par/ 
[https://perma.cc/2MFL-UWDH]. 
 28 See generally Sandra K. Miller et al., An Empirical Glimpse into Limited Liability Companies: 
Assessing the Need to Protect Minority Investors, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 609 (2006) (analyzing the results 
of a study involving state LLC laws and the ramifications for the negotiation of LLC agreements hav-
ing minority members). 
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statutorily forbid entities from contracting away fiduciary duties at all.29 Be-
cause Delaware permits fiduciary duties to be eliminated wholesale, it demon-
strates a strong respect for a contractarian spirit more so than any other state in 
the country. This principle is consistent with both Delaware law generally and 
LLCs specifically, which were created as vehicles that uphold the freedom of 
contract. 
Still, Delaware courts have recognized that the LLC Act is inconsistent 
with a “purely contractarian view”: 
To my mind, when a sovereign makes available an entity with at-
tributes that contracting parties cannot grant themselves by agree-
ment, the entity is not purely contractual. Because the entity has tak-
en advantage of benefits that the sovereign has provided, the sover-
eign retains an interest in that entity. That interest in turn calls for 
preserving the ability of the sovereign’s courts to oversee and, if 
necessary, dissolve the entity. Put more directly, an LLC agreement 
is not an exclusively private contract among its members precisely 
because the LLC has powers that only the State of Delaware can 
confer. Those powers affect the rights of third parties, who at a min-
imum must take into account the LLC’s separate legal existence and 
its members’ limited liability shield.30 
This language is important because it walks back the radically contractarian 
view typically associated with Delaware corporate entities. Clear evidence of 
this idea is section 18-1101(e) of the LLC Act, as a “purely contractarian” enti-
ty would logically be permitted to contract away liability for violations of the 
implied covenant. Thus, this rare instance of a limiting principle in the context 
of Delaware LLCs should be taken very seriously, as it eschews the traditional-
ly contractarian deference granted by Delaware laws and courts. In fact, the 
implied covenant is of even more importance in Delaware than almost any-
where else because it serves as a last-ditch effort against inappropriate director 
behavior absent the duties of care or loyalty. In this light, it only makes sense 
that the implied covenant may not be violated by anything but actions taken in 
bad faith. A reading of the statute that would permit neutral faith violations of 
the covenant fails to appreciate the overall guiding principles reflected in Del-
aware law, focusing instead on the semantics of the statute and the lack of total 
clarity from Delaware courts. A reasoned approach that considers the unique 
historical position of the implied covenant in reference to its relationship with 
the duties of care and loyalty is a much more rational interpretation. 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 605.0105 (2015). 
 30 In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, C.A. No. 10280–VCL, 2015 WL 1947027, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
30, 2015). 
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CONCLUSION 
Alleging a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
necessitates a rare, fact-intensive exercise that should not be used to alter the 
otherwise express language of a contract. In determining whether or not “neu-
tral faith” or “non-bad faith” violations of the implied covenant are permissible 
under Delaware LLC law, Delaware courts should look to the relatively short 
history of the covenant, the contractarian spirit of Delaware laws and courts, 
and section 18-1101 of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act to hold, 
despite the statute’s somewhat sloppy language, that the implied covenant can 
only be violated in bad faith. 
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